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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JESS BEl ... TLER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
l'S. 
DE"\V.AIN BERGER, 
Defendent and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7438 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ST.A_TE~fENT OF FACTS 
:i\'[uch of the Statement of Facts by appellant con-
tains the testin1ony n1ost favorable to the defendant, 
but ~ince the facts in the case are not long nor com-
plicated \ve refrain fro1n repeating the statement of 
facts stated but content ourselves "\vith briefly adding 
the follo,ving facts: 
Even though the plaintiff accepted the word of the 
defendant at the time and place of the shooting that 
the shooting \\~as to scare the horses and did not at that 
ti1ne aeense defendant of shooting the animal the next 
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1norn1ng, ''Thieh \\'as the next n1eeting of the parties, 
he did pro1uptly accuse the defendant of shooting the 
animal and at that time the defendant told the plaintiff 
in substance "that he could shoot anything on his 
property as long as he left it lay." They had an argu-
Inent about that. (Tr 58) 
The plaintiff could not get the colt at first so 
took the other animals home and retuned at once for 
this colt. The colt was now down and laid down twice 
while he was taking it home, and he thought it had 
a bad case of colic (Tr. 56) but later in the morning 
on examination he discovered the bullet hole above 
the flank. (Tr 57) On cross examination the plaintiff 
testified in answer to questions by appellant's counsel 
that he could tell the bullet had gone ''right in through 
the intestines. I arrived at the conclusion he had shot 
the animal. I heard the shot and there was no other 
conclusion to arrive at \Vhen there was bullet hole 
through her. ' ' ( Tr 67) 
rr"he plaintiff testified that it 'vas l110re than t'vo 
rnonths after the shooting before anything was said 
about gun balistics and that in the meantime there 
'vere lots of places to put the gun that had been used. 
(Tr 69) 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent will take up ·appellant's points In the 
same order they are presented in his brief. 
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.. \~signntents 1 and 2. Plaintiff's evidence a8 to 
reputation. 
The appellant assigns as error the Trial Court's 
per1nitting the plaintiff, in rebuttal, to introduce ev-
idence of the plaintiff's reputation in the con1munity 
for keeping his ani1nals penned up in the yard in the 
usual 1nanner. This evidence \vent to the question of 
nn1nber of tilnes the plaintiff's anin1als had trespassed 
upon defendant's premises and consequently the amount 
of dan1ages to 'vhieh defendant 'vas entitled on the 
counterclain1. The jury fixed his dan1ages at $25.00. In 
his notice of appeal he did not purport to appeal from 
the verdict in his favor on· the counterclaim. Under 
these circu1nstances the assignment cannot be prejudic-
ial on this appeal. 
Briefly on the n1erits of the ruling, however, it 
~hould be said that there 'vas evidence that plaintiff's 
fences 'vere in order and the fresh sno"\v was so deep 
that the animals escaped over the fence Tr 61). De-
fendant offered son1e evidence the animals trespassed 
on his pre1nises on a number of occasions. This evidence 
'vas disputed by other 'vitnesses (Tr 98, 120, 121, 125). 
rrhe evidence was n1aterial on the matter of the amount 
of damages caused by the anin1als. Counsel's authority 
in 22 C. J. go to the question of defendants character 
in cri1ninal cases and has no bearing here. 
The question of a1nount of dan1ages 'vas for the 
jnr:'" and it 'vas therefore proper rebuttal after de-
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fendant 's rross exan1ination of plaintiff on the subject 
(Tr 61) to sho\v plaintiff's reputation in the community 
as ·to such conduct, such evidence being relevant to 
the issue of amount of damages. 
3 to 10. Sufficiency of Evidence to Sustain Verdict 
and Judgment. 
The appellant addresses the same arguments to 
this Court about the evidence that he did to the jury; 
viz, the plaintiff only heard the defendant shoot once. 
The animal had been struck by two bullets. Under the 
rule that evidence should be reconciled if possible it 
was the duty of the jury to reconcile the evidence by 
finding the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendant 
shot the bullet that killed the animal. It is contended that 
all of this argun1ent rnerely goes to the weight of the 
evidence. The vveight of the eviQ.ence is for the jury and 
the rule is so \vell established that no exhaustive list 
of cases are here cited, that this court on appeal will 
not exa1nine into the weight of the evidence but will 
only inquire as to whether or not there is any substantial 
t:~vidence to support the verdict. From State Bank of 
Beaver vs IIollingshead 82 Ut. 416, 25 Pac 2nd 612 we 
qnote the following: 
"It is no consequence \Vhat our opinion may 
be as to the facts. If there is substantial evidenee 
to sustain the verdict~ this court is powerless to 
set it aside. (Citing previous Utah cases) ~fany 
cases to this effect have been decided hy this 
court.'' 
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The evidence and circu1nstances here not only sup-
port the verdict but the verdict is the only logical 
rpsnlt fron1 the evidence. r:I~he anin1al \vas in good health 
the night before. It "Tas early in the 1norning in a rural 
eonnnunity. Plaintiff happened along just at the time 
defendant shot. The bullet "Tas a 22 bullet. The animal 
had not yet gone do"\\rn \Yhen plaintiff rode out to the 
horses but it did not 1nove and plaintiff took his other 
ani1nals ho1ne. \\'.hen he can1e back in a few minutes 
the ani1nal "Tas do\vn. It \vent down t'vo or three times 
on his "Tay ho1ne ( 300 yards) ; it acted like a bad case 
of colic. He exan1ined and found the bullet hole. He 
called the veterinarian. There vvas nothing he could 
do and he expected the animal to die that day. It did 
die that night. The veterinarian's testimony that the 
anin1al died as a result of the gun shot wound is not 
disputed. It is difficult to imagine a more complete case. 
The fact that the defendant offered evidence that there 
\Vas other shooting in the neighborhood (not the same 
1norning) and the horse also carried another flesh wound 
1night he so1ne ground for argu1nent that the death 
1night have resulted from a bullet fired by someone 
else, but jf this could be dignified to be called a dispute 
in the evidence it went only to its weight. The jury 
rightly concluded that the testimony could not be 
har1nonized in defendant's ·favor. 
The malpractice case of Edwards vs Clark 83 Pac 
2nd 1021 is not in point in any way and we have no 
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quarrel \vith the rule that a verdict must have more 
to support it than a possibility that it might have hap-
pened in that manner. Neither does the rule in 32 C.J.S. 
at 1133 that evidence is inconsistent with direct, positive 
and other,vise· uncontradicted testimony that a fact does 
not exist \Yill not support an inference that it does, have 
ah~y application to the facts in this case. The rule is 
that facts need not in every case be established by exact 
scientific uncontradicted evidence. It is enough that 
sufficient evidence of a fact be offered to convince a 
reasonable person of the existence of the fact. 
Balistics. Counsel on cross exa1nination elicited 
fron1 the plaintiff that about t\vo and one-half months 
after the shooting defendant suggested that they have a 
halistics test of the gun and bullet found in the horse 
as a Ineans of settling the case. Plaintiff declined to 
take the bait saying that it \vould be an easy matter 
to bring in some other gun. In fact, it would seem very 
logical for the defendant to do that very thing before 
making such an offer. He could have resorted to a 
balistics examination of the bullet and his gun if he 
cared to do so~ Counsel argued this rna tter very fully 
to the j-ury. The jury did not appear to be impressed. 
It was a question of weight of the evidence for the 
jury \Vas settled by the verdict. Certainly, there is no-
thing in this circumstance to require this court to hold 
as a matter of la\v that the defendant would have 
snb1nitted the san1e gun \vith which he admittedly fire<J. 
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tht\ ~hot on that n1orn1ng. 
Instrurtion No. 4. Plaintiff assigns as error the giv-
Ing of Instruction No. 4 to the effect that defendant 
had no right to kill a trespassing animal. Apparantly 
it i~ eonreded that the instruction contains a correct 
state1nent of the la,,-, 3 C.J. 2nd 1328 Section 213 . 
... \ppellant objects to the instruction for the reason 
''The jury ,,-as told by the court, in effect, in this in-
struction, that the defendant claimed the. right to kill 
the aniinal if it was trespassing when no such claim 
'vas 1nade either in the pleadings or in the evidence.'' , 
The instruction. says nothing about defendant's claim-
ing a right to kill the animal. The evidence does how-
eYer sho\Y that at the time the plaintiff accused the 
defendant of shooting the animal, defendant said in 
substance that he ''had a right to shoot anything on 
his place as long as he left it lay there." (Tr 58) An 
exa1nination of the entire record also sho,vs that the 
subject \vas brought up by the court in his examination 
of the jury and this instruction was not given for the 
purpose of. inferring claims by either people but of 
narro,ving the issues to be decided by the jury and in-
forining them that there was no issue in the case of a 
right to kill the _animal. If there was any error it was 
clearly har1nless. Considered as an instruction limiting 
the issues it was just as much in defendant's favor 
as in favor of the plaintiff. The error was also harmless 
hPJ'<• hecanse the jur~- rendered no general verdict. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
Appellant also asserts that it is reversible error 
for the Court to instruct on plaintiff's theory of the 
case and to ignore the defendant's theory. The case was 
subrnitted to the jury upon special interrogatories, 
which in no way favored either theory of the case, 
but left the findings of fact, based on the evidence, 
up to the jury. On such interrogatories, the jury found 
that the defendant did shoot the plaintiff's horse, there-
by causing its death, which finding was in plaintiff's 
favor and which accepted his theory of the case. As 
to the Court's instructions which accompanied the 
special interrogatories, they were in part based on re-
quested instructions submitted by the plaintiff. Defend-
ant, on the other hand, failed to submit any requests 
for instructions, and the rule is well settled that error 
cannot be based on failure to give particular instructions 
'vhen no request therefor is made. Taylor vs. Los 
1\.ngeles & S.L. Ry. Co., 61 Utah 524, 216 Pac. 239; 
Salt Lake & U. Ry Co. vs Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 
Pac. 90. The authority cited by appellant supports this 
rule of law in the following language, found in Nash 
vs Myers, 54 Ida. 283, 31 P. ( 2d) 273, at page 181: 
(Cited by appellant at p. 19 _of Appellant's Brief.) 
"***the Court should instruct on appellant's 
as well as respondents' theories of the case 
where appropriate instructions are presented.'' 
(Italics supplied) 
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.A.ssigninent of Error 11 
Appellant assigns as error the trial court's re-
fusal to grant a ne"\Y trial on defendant's motion which 
"-as based upon an affidavit by the defendant, Dewain 
Berger, as to certain alleged mis-conduct of one of the 
jurors, Gny E. ~Ierrill. The affidavit of the defendant 
filed in support of the n1otion for a new trial comes 
squarely "-ith the case of Glazier vs. Cram, 71 Utah 
+G3, 26·7 Pac. 188. The defendant's affidavit is appar-
ently based on hearsay, or at best, upon information 
and belief. This Court, in the Glazier case made the 
following statement: 
".}Iuch of the 1natter stated in the affidavits 
is alleged on inforn1ation and belief. As to such 
n1atter the brief of counsel for defendant calls 
our attention to the follo,ving language in Hayne 
on N e\\- Trial (Rev. Ed.) p. 240: 
~ ' .. A_ffidavits based upon information and be-
ief are 'vholly valueless for the purp.ose of es-
tablishing the facts upon which an irregularity 
of this description' 
'' 'l,he affidavits of jurors are inadmissable 
to in1peach their verdict, except where it was 
arrived at by resort to chance.'' 
The defendant's affidavit does not purport to set 
forth when or where or to whom or under what cir-
cumstances the Juror !ferrill made the alleged state-
ment, and even if he had made the statement and it 
had been true it would not have been grounds for 
ehallenge of the juror for cause. 
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The Court then cites considerable authority In 
support of this rule. 
The affidavit relied upon by appellant, aside from 
the defects above noted, is not in and o~ itself sufficient 
grounds for the granting of a new trial. The affidavit 
states··· that one of the jurymen called upon his own 
knowledge and experience in considering the case. This 
is a necessary function of all juries, and each and every 
juryman 1nust depend on his knowledge and exper-
ience in weighing evidence. The rule as stated in the 
authority cited by the defendant and appellant at page 
20 of his Brief, 39, Am. Jur. page 96, section 83, is as 
follo"rs: That a juror is not precluded ''from ·-applying 
his o"'n general knowledge and experience to the ex-
ainination of the case In estimating the weight of the 
evidence.'' 
The appellant further alleges that the said juror 
acted to appellant's prejudice in failing to answer 
truthfully the Court's questions to the jury. An ex-
amination of the questions asked by the Court, as set 
out on pages 20 and 21 of appellant's Brief, and com-
pared with the contents of the affidavit, will show that 
the ·juror in no way made a false ans,ver. The Court's 
questions had to do with experience with taking an· 
imals to the pound and with trespassing animals eating 
hay. There were no questions about any of the jurY1Jlen 
having experience with ''this kind of a situation as the 
shooting of horse" as alleged in appellant's brief. If 
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appellant ·s counsel had desired to pursue further ques-
tioning on this point, the opportunity was available to 
hin1. He did not atte1npt to do so, and is now estopped 
fron1 con1plaining that this jurJinan should have been 
challenged. Johnson vs. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P. 
(2d) 134, "~herein the Court. stated, when discussing 
a situation similiar to that set up by appellant in the 
instant case: 
~·Counsel for the defendant did not attempt 
on voir dire to ascertain the existence of such 
relationship so that he could -interpose a chal-
lenge. Rather, as noted by the trial court 'counsel 
is atte1npting to impose a legaL obligation upon 
a lay juror to disclose technical sources of 
possible preudice. which counsel, himself, failed 
to pursue.' '' 
.J._t\ppellant, at the trial, was satisfied with his ques-
tioning of the jury, and cannot now place the burden 
upon the jurymen to disclose every possible experience 
in their life ".,.hich may have some degree of similarity 
'vith the evidenee which might be later presented to 
them. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant did not appeal from the part of the 
judgment that allowed him $25.00 damages and there-
fore cannot complain that the jury should have awarded 
hiin $50.00 in place of the $25.00. 
The case 'vas fully and fairly submitted to the jury. 
It is a small case and nothing has been presented to 
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establish that the administration of justice should put 
these parties to the expense of another trial. Nothing 
i~ 1nade to appear that a new trial would reach a differ-
ent result. The verdict of the jury in favor of the plain-
tiff was clearly sustained by the evidence and the judg-
tnent should therefore be affirmed. 
M. C. HARRIS and 
C~HARLES P. OLSON 
Attorneys for respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
